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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LEGAL CHANGE, AND 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Andrew C. Michaels* 
This article argues in favor of the proposition that Article III judges 
should remain human, a proposition which turns out to be more 
controversial than one might think.  Some contemporary legal academic 
literature has been arguing, to varying degrees, that replacing human 
made law with artificial intelligence (“AI”) will or should happen.  Most 
directly, Eugene Volokh has recently posed an interesting thought 
experiment asking this basic question: if AI advances to the point where 
it can adequately mimic judicial opinion writing, should we accept an AI 
judge?  Professor Volokh argues that we should, but this essay 
respectfully disagrees.  Although AI technology is currently far from this 
point, this essay engages with Professor Volokh’s thought experiment, in 
the hopes that it could lead to some valuable insights into the importance 
of humans in the legal system.   
In Professor Volokh’s view, the resulting judicial opinion is all that 
matters; he maintains that: “If a system reliably yields opinions that we 
view as sound, we should accept it, without insisting on some 
predetermined structure for how the opinions are produced.”1  This essay 
takes issue with that basic premise.  The judiciary is more than just an 
opinion factory.  There is significant value in the human involvement in 
the process leading to the production of the opinion.   
Perhaps the most common argument along these lines is that the 
process fosters procedural fairness, which leads to deeper public 
acceptance of the result and the legitimacy of the court system.2  But this 
article seeks to draw attention instead to some related but different reasons 
that the process itself has significant value, reasons that seem not to be as 
thoroughly considered in this literature.   
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.  The author thanks the editors of the 
Cincinnati Law Review, as well as those who have provided helpful comments, including those who 
participated in the 2019 South Eastern Association of Law Schools Annual Conference New Scholars 
Workshop, the 2019 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at DePaul University College of Law, the 
Fall 2019 IP Colloquium at BYU Law School, the 2020 AALS annual conference New Voices in IP 
Scholarship panel, the winter 2020 JIPSA workshop at Saint Louis University School of Law, and the 
2020 WIPIP conference at Santa Clara University School of Law.  The author also particularly thanks 
Emily Berman, Eric Goldman, James Nelson, Renee Knake, Sapna Kumar, Joseph Miller, Richard Re, 
Rachel Sachs, Joseph Sanders, Pierre Schlag, Harry Surden, Alfred Yen, and Peter Yu for helpful 
comments, as well as Rahul Rao for helpful research assistance.  Finally, the author thanks Professor 
Eugene Volokh for posing this interesting thought experiment.   
 1. Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1138 (2019). 
 2. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat The Law?  The Rise of Hybrid Social-
Ordering Systems, 119 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1, 2 (2019). 
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Rather than focusing on the therapeutic and psychological value of the 
right to be heard by another human, this essay instead focuses on the 
epistemic losses and societal risks that could result from an AI judiciary 
in terms of our ability to monitor, shape, understand, and think about the 
law.  In other words, rather than focusing on the citizen’s or litigant’s 
right to be heard, this essay focuses instead on the law’s ability to “hear” 
or be shaped by the human society that it rules.   
By engaging in the process of arguing in front of a judge and 
constructing legal arguments that potentially affect the outcome of the 
potentially precedential case, the human legal community comes to 
understand and play a role in shaping the law.  This spreads power in the 
sense that it gives judges, the legal community, and even to a lesser degree 
the public as litigants, some hand in shaping the law.  Human involvement 
in the law also provides strong incentives for a substantial and well-
informed legal community to pay close attention to the law.  Under a 
system where humans collectively create the law, it is not some black box 
authority to be blindly obeyed; it can be questioned and shaped through 
reasoned argument.  An AI judge, on the other hand, is much more of a 
black box unpersuadable authority, even if it does mimic humans by 
providing reasons in its judicial “opinion.”   
Professor Volokh focuses on the AI judge’s ability to write a persuasive 
opinion, but overlooks the importance of the ability of the judge to be 
persuaded.  A human judge can potentially be persuaded through reasoned 
legal argument, whereas it is not clear that the same can be said of an AI 
judge.  It may be the relatively rare case that turns on the quality of 
argument before the human judge, but the fact that such cases can and do 
exist is important.  Judicial persuadability contributes to the impression, 
and the reality, that the legal community and the public may play a role 
in shaping the law through argument, such that the law is a collective 
societal creation.  Even if it were possible to construct a persuadable AI,3 
we would be faced with the vexing problem of having to decide upon 
what factors the AI should be persuadable.  Thus, this Article argues that 
even if an AI judge could adequately mimic judicial opinion writing, there 
are nevertheless significant practical reasons not to accept AI as a 
replacement for human judges.       
This Article proceeds with two main points.  First, this Article 
discusses the proper role of the judiciary in legal change, that is, in 
shaping the law and adapting it to a constantly changing society.  
Currently, courts do more than simply apply the law; they also make law, 
though they do so in a more measured way than legislatures.  They must 
 
 3. Cf. Emily Berman, Individualized Suspicion in the Age of Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 463, 
502 (2020) (explaining that there are “factors relevant to legal decision-making that machines are simply 
incapable of taking into account”). 
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balance respect for precedent and stability against the need for law to 
adapt to changing and unforeseen circumstances through adjudication. 
Judges sometimes must choose between incommensurable values.  The 
differences of opinion that arise between judges or between litigants can 
have epistemic value in that they help to flesh out and publicize debates 
about what is the best law or policy.  The human legal system creates a 
beneficial updating dialogue between the law and the human society that 
it governs, and there are significant benefits to having judges who are also 
a part of that society.        
Second, it is far from clear that an AI judiciary would be able to 
effectively check the power of the other two branches.  The argument for 
artificially intelligent law is shortsighted and overlooks certain long-term 
effects.  Without human judges, we could lose much of the community of 
professionals paying attention to the law.  We will have replaced legal 
thought with artificial legal thought.  If we as a society don’t know how 
to drive cars in the future, that may be fine, but if we forget how to think 
about the law, this could be problematic.  For one thing, it could hinder 
our ability to adjust the law to changing societal circumstances.  It would 
also make society less aware of the law.  The diffusion of knowledge of 
the law throughout the human judiciary, legal community, and public, 
may be important to separation of powers.   
The argument here is primarily against replacing the actual decision-
making of the Article III judicial branch with AI.  This article is not 
opposing AI as a tool to aid in research or as an AI staff attorney.4  Nor is 
it opposing AI in the private sector, say, for medical purposes,5 or even 
some private sector AI lawyers to the extent they are effective with human 
judges. Nor is this article even arguing against the use of AI for some 
decision-making in administrative agencies of the executive branch, or in 
arbitration.  Replacing the judicial branch decision-makers with artificial 
intelligence is particularly problematic, so that is the focus here.  The 
choice to draw the line at Article III judges is admittedly somewhat 
arbitrary, but this article argues that a line must be drawn somewhere, and 
that Article III is a reasonable place to draw it.  The human legal 
community is in large part built around Article III judges, and it seems 
likely that as long as there are human judges, there will remain a demand 
for at least some human lawyers, as at least some human judges would 
likely find human lawyers more persuasive.6  So at least some higher end 
 
 4. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1148. 
 5. Cf. Jason Chung & Amanda Zink, Hey Watson, Can I Sue You for Malpractice?  Examining 
the Liability of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 11 ASIA-PACIFIC J. HLTH L. & ETHICS 51 (2018).  
 6. Cf. Dana Remus and Frank Levy, Can Robots be Lawyers?  Computers, Lawyers, and the 
Practice of Law, ABA LAW PRACTICE DIVISION 59 (July 20, 2016) (“The rule of law necessitates respect 
for and compliance with law from a variety of sources even absent active enforcement . . . and it requires 
3
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litigants would likely remain willing to pay for human lawyers to argue 
before the human judges, for example in difficult appellate cases that 
could reasonably go either way.  Thus maintaining human Article III 
judges would at least maintain a portion of the human legal community 
built around them, while still allowing for the use of some legal AI in 
other ways.7 
Part I briefly introduces the arguments that some contemporary legal 
scholars make in favor of replacing (to at least some degree) law with AI 
and offers some preliminary responses.  Parts II and III then track the two 
main points set forth above: the role of the human judiciary in legal 
change and separation of powers, respectively.  This Article concludes by 
considering some of the potential benefits of AI judges, and some 
alternative ways in which such benefits could be achieved.   
I. THE ARGUMENTS FOR ARTIFICIAL LAW 
In his recent essay, Chief Justice Robots, Eugene Volokh argues that if 
AI technology reaches the point that it can “create persuasive opinions, 
capable of regularly winning opinion-writing competitions against human 
judges,” then “we should in principle accept it as a judge.”8  As Volokh 
recognizes, this is a “thought experiment,” as AI technology is currently 
far from this point.9  Nevertheless, such a thought experiment can provoke 
important discussions about the proper role of humans versus artificial 
intelligence in the legal field.  
Professor Volokh’s argument that we should replace judges with AI is 
contingent on them passing what he calls the “Modified John Henry 
Test,” an opinion writing competition wherein “a computer program is 
arrayed against, say, ten average performers” in the given field, and if “the 
computer performs at least as well as the average performer,” then it 
 
participation in the development and application of law, and its evolution over time.  These are things that 
lawyers uniquely ensure and support, but that computers cannot and do not.”).  Frank Pasquale, A Rule of 
Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 55 (2019) (“A robust 
and ethical legal profession respects that discretion, founded on the flexibility and subtlety of legal 
language, as a prerequisite for a just and accountable social order.”) 
 7. My argument here is that at the very least, Article III judges should remain human, but many 
of the arguments here could also counsel against the use of say, AI law clerks.  There are benefits to using 
human law clerks in that they learn and become members of the human legal community, which is 
important as discussed herein.  Perhaps it should be left up to individual judges whether they want to 
continue to use human law clerks versus AI.  In any event, at least the judges should remain human.     
 8. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1135 (aside from creating persuasive opinions, a second condition is 
that the software must “be adequately protected against hacking and similar attacks”). 
 9. Id. at 1137.  This paper thus falls more into what has been called the “futurist” category of AI 
literature.  See Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA ST. L. REV. 1305, 1306 
(2019) (“A key motivation in writing this article is to provide a realistic, demystified view of AI that is 
rooted in the actual capabilities of the technology.  This is meant to contrast with discussions about AI 
and law that are decidedly futurist in nature.”). 
4
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passes the test and is an “adequate substitute for humans.”10  Whether the 
program passes the test is determined by “a panel of, say, ten human 
judges who are known to be experts in the subject,” who must “evaluate 
everyone’s performance without knowing which participant is a computer 
and which is a human.”11  This panel of experts will be herein referred to 
as the “evaluators,” as in Professor Volokh’s essay.   
According to Professor Volokh, “prospective AI Supreme Court 
Justices should be measured against the quality of average candidates for 
the job – generally experienced, respected appellate judges.”12  Professor 
Volokh’s criterion for evaluation is “persuasiveness,” that is, “if the 
Henry Test evaluator panelists are persuaded by the argument for” the AI 
judge’s chosen result.  If (again, as a thought experiment) an AI judge can 
consistently pass this test, Professor Volokh argues that we should adopt 
it, because it is “likely to be much cheaper, quicker, and less subject to 
certain forms of bias,” thus making the legal system “not only more 
efficient but also fairer and more accessible to poor and middle-class 
litigants.”13   
Although Professor Volokh makes this argument most directly, his 
view is not entirely an anomaly; some other legal scholarship has been 
trending in a similar direction.  For example, Professor Aziz Huq argues 
that there is no right to a human decision, but instead merely “a right to a 
well-calibrated machine decision.”14  In the same vein, Professors 
Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett have predicted that like self-driving 
cars, “laws, too, will be self-driving,”15 and that advances in AI and 
communications technology will “be able to identify the rules applicable 
to an actual situation and inform the regulated actor exactly how to 
comply” such that “microdirectives will become the dominant form of 
law[.]”16  They predict that “opportunities for statutory interpretation and 
filling the gaps in vague standards will dry up as citizens are simply 
instructed to obey simple directives.”17  Casey and Niblett recognize that 
“citizens who simply follow rules and directives may become robotic, 
mere automatons,” but nevertheless state that the “trend towards micro-
directives will be real as the cost of prediction and communication 
 
 10. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1138-39. 
 11. Id. at 1139. 
 12. Id. at 1140. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 106 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2020). 
 15. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429, 442 (2016) 
[hereinafter Self-Driving Laws].  
 16. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 
1404 (2017). 
 17. Id. at 1435.  
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falls.”18  When it comes to judges and the law though, the discussion is 
about the public sector, so whether the legal system should move in this 
direction is a normative question, one that Professors Casey and Niblett 
explicitly decline to address.19 
Just as the person using GPS navigation does not learn their way 
around the roads,20 the more we turn law over to machines, the more we 
as a society may forget how to think about law.21  In other words, if a 
person uses GPS navigation, that person does not develop as much of an 
internal sense of direction.  Likewise, the greater the role machines play 
in legal decision-making, the greater the risk that society collectively 
loses its ability to determine, understand, question, criticize, and 
potentially shape the law.  Even if the AI judges are working initially, 
there is no guarantee that something will not eventually go wrong.  To the 
contrary, as with all technology, something eventually will go wrong.22  
Contemporary society does seem to have some tendency to adopt new 
technologies before they are entirely ready.23  But if society has lost its 
ability to “judge” the law, then it may have also lost its ability to adapt 
when the inevitable problems arise.   
 
 18. Self-Driving Laws, supra note 15, at 438.  
 19. See Casey & Niblett, supra note 16, at 1405 (“Our analysis is positive rather than normative.”). 
I have previously criticized this deterministic aspect of their work and so will not rehash the issue here.  
See Andrew C. Michaels, Abstract Innovation, Virtual Ideas, and Artificial Legal Thought, 14 MAR. J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 25 (2019). Cf. Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially 
Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242, 247 (2019) (“over time, increasing use of AI adjudication 
will foster changes in values that are conducive to even greater use of AI adjudication, thereby creating a 
self-reinforcing cycle”).  
 20. See, e.g., Joseph Stromberg, Is GPS ruining our ability to navigate for ourselves?, VOX (Sept. 
2, 2015, 11:31 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/9/2/9242049/gps-maps-navigation (“we have good 
reason to believe that when we blindly follow GPS for direction, we’re not exercising crucial navigational 
skills – and many of the scientists who study how the human brain navigates are concerned.”). 
 21. Cf. Deborah Cassens Weiss, ‘Beware the Robots,’ Chief Justice Tells High School Graduates, 
ABA J. (June 8, 2018 4:10 PM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/beware_the_robots_chief_justice_tells_high_school_graduates
/ [https://perma.cc/FBQ6-4PKT] (“‘My worry is not that machines will start thinking like us,’ Roberts 
said.  ‘I worry that we will start thinking like machines.’”). 
 22. For a fictional example, see Futurama, Fear of a Bot Planet (FOX television broadcast Apr. 
20, 1999) (Computer Judge: “Thank you prosecutor, I will now consider the evidence.”. . . [Sorry A 
System Error Occurred], Robot Clerk: “Uh oh! He froze up again!”  Robot Mayor: “Try control alt 
delete.”). 
 23. Cf. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where Robots 
Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018); Clark D. Asay, Artificial Stupidity, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020)(manuscript at 4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399170 (“despite the incessant hype 
about and ever growing uses of AI, many AI experts lament a lack of any real progress in the AI space”); 
Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal Services, 2015 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1797, 1802 (2016) (“When a disruption occurs before all of the core functions of an industry have 
been innovated, there is a risk that this Incomplete Innovation will force the un-innovated core functions 
to become scarce or disappear.”). 
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II. LEGAL CHANGE 
Professor Volokh’s Modified John Henry test for adoption does not 
adequately account for the role that the judiciary plays in shaping the law.  
Professor Volokh does recognize that “[l]aw development – whether 
common law development, constitutional law development, or 
interpretive development about statues – often requires prediction: Would 
a proposed legal rule do more good or harm?”24  But in his view, “we 
humans don’t set the bar very high,” so “AIs don’t need to have perfect 
clairvoyance or legal statesmanship” to beat us.25  According to Professor 
Volokh, “success in the Henry Test will be the best measure of judicial 
quality,” that is, “[i]f the evaluators are persuaded by the AI judge’s 
prediction-based arguments more than by the human judges’ arguments, 
why should we doubt the AI judge’s abilities more than we doubt the 
human judges’ abilities?”26   
Professor Volokh’s point that humans do not have perfect clairvoyance 
is certainly true, but human judges do not need it because they are able to 
update the law over time in response to changing and unforeseen societal 
circumstances in the society of which they are a part.  It is not clear that 
an AI judiciary would be able to do the same thing, or at least, Professor 
Volokh’s Modified John Henry test for adoption does not ensure that it 
would.  Professor Volokh’s test is based on persuasiveness to a panel of 
evaluators at a particular point in time.  But what is persuasive at one point 
in time is not necessarily persuasive later on, as the factual realities and 
moral values of society shift.27  Furthermore, no matter how many “test 
cases” the evaluators look at, the test cases will never adequately 
encompass the full range of possible fact situations that could and will 
arise in the future. 
Although written almost a century ago, Benjamin Cardozo’s The 
Growth of Law has a good deal of relevance to Professor Volokh’s 
thought experiment.  Responding to some agitation for a more rigid 
conception of stare decisis, then Judge (later Justice) Cardozo set forth a 
persuasive explication and defense of the judicial role in legal 
development.28  According to Judge Cardozo, legislation alone is not a 
sufficient agency of legal growth, because “[u]nique situations can never 
 
 24. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1183. 
 25. Id. at 1184. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Cf. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(“‘Improper’ will always be a word of many nuances, determined by time, place, and circumstances.”). 
 28. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 132-133 (1924) (“Stare decisis is not 
in the constitution, but I should be half ready to put it there, and to add thereto the requirement of 
mechanical and literal reproduction, if only it were true that legislation is a sufficient agency of growth.  
The centuries, if they have proved anything, have proved the need of something more.”). 
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have their answers ready made as in the complete letter-writing guides or 
the manuals of the art of conversation.”29  That is, situations that the 
legislature (or the prior precedent writing court) did not anticipate ex ante 
will inevitably arise, and it is one job of the courts to gradually adjust the 
law ex post on a case-by-case basis, while applying it to a particular 
controversy.30  As Judge Friendly has also explained, it “is impossible for 
the legislator to foresee everything,” and “a code, however complete it 
may appear, is no sooner promulgated than a thousand unexpected 
questions are presented to the judge.”31  
This is part of why precedential holdings are not (and should not be) 
rigidly set in stone, but rather can (and should) be gradually shaped by 
subsequent decisions, in light of changing circumstances and new 
information.32  Even lower courts sometimes “narrow ambiguous 
precedents that have become outdated in light of new events or 
technologies.”33  As Judge Cardozo put it: “adaption of rule or principle 
to changing combinations of events demands the creative action of the 
judge.”34  The fact that judges help shape the law supports the notion that 
we are governing ourselves through rule of law, rather than being 
commanded by some pure assertion of authority.35  The law is something 
that human society creates, monitors, and updates, not an external 
governing force.  The primary purpose of legal argument through briefing 
and oral presentation to a human judge is not just that it provides 
therapeutic benefits to the litigant, it is rather that it provides the 
opportunity to persuade the judge, and thus potentially shape the law, to 
the extent that the opinion rendered is precedential.  As such, it is not only 
judges that currently shape the law, but also litigants, acting (usually) 
through lawyers.  But this ability to shape the law depends on the human 
 
 29. Id. at 133. 
 30. Id. (“Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by slow advances.”). 
 31. Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer – Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 220 
(1961). 
 32. See Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, 70 ARK. L. REV. 661, 679 (2017) 
(“generalizations will not always be perfect; the courts cannot be expected to foresee or fully consider all 
potential fact situations falling within the generalizations that they necessarily make”); CARDOZO, supra 
note 28, at 138 (“The rule as announced must be deemed tentative.  For the many and varying facts to 
which it will be applied cannot be foreseen.”); ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 161 
(1983) (“since precedent is the style of Anglo-Saxon law, the courts define a new technology as a special 
case of a familiar one.”). 
 33. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 925 
(2016). 
 34. CARDOZO, supra note 28, at 135. 
 35. Cf. id. at 137-38 (“This power of creation, if it is to be exercised with vision and understanding, 
exacts a philosophy of law, a theory of its genesis and growth and aim. Only thus shall we be saved from 
the empiricism which finds in an opinion not a prophecy to inspire, but a command to be obeyed.”); 
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636-37 (1995) (“The act of giving a reason is 
the antithesis of authority. When the voice of authority fails, the voice of reason emerges. Or vice versa.”). 
8
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judge being potentially persuadable.  Professor Volokh’s argument 
focuses on the AI judge’s ability to write a persuasive opinion,36 but it 
seems to overlook the importance of the ability of the judge to be 
persuaded.  Indeed, Professor Volokh’s conception of an AI judge seems 
to render persuasive argument by litigants unnecessary.37  It might be 
possible to construct a persuadable AI, but then we are left with difficult 
questions regarding what factors the AI should be persuaded based on.  In 
any event, these questions are not addressed by a test that merely asks 
whether the AI can issue persuasive opinions. 
Professor Volokh recognizes the potentially controversial nature of his 
focus on “persuasiveness” as the key evaluation metric.38  While 
persuasiveness may be ideal for a lawyer, the task of a judge writing an 
opinion is different.  The judge must acknowledge the arguments on both 
sides and explain why the judge is choosing one side over the other (or 
choosing some middle ground) and then decide how broadly to write the 
decision with an eye towards both its ex ante precedential effects and 
consistency with prior precedent.  Moreover, when the judge is faced with 
a difficult decision, the value of candor counsels that the judge should 
acknowledge the difficulty, even though this may hinder persuasiveness 
(depending on one’s point of view).39  An open acknowledgement of a 
“close case” may play a role in how the decision is interpreted in the future 
as the law continues to develop; for example, the decision may be read 
more narrowly as a result.  A focus on persuasiveness does not necessarily 
capture the quality of measured carefulness that that is arguably just as if 
not more important in judges as they shape the law through precedential 
decisions. 
Persuasiveness is also inherently subjective; indeed it is difficult to 
think of many things that are more quintessentially subjective.  Deciding 
whether one is persuaded by an argument, like judging, often requires a 
choice between incommensurable values; it is not a matter of mere 
numerical calculation.40  To the extent that lawyers and judges are all 
 
 36. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1140-41.  
 37. See id. at 1141 (“If we can create an AI brief-writer that can persuade, we can create an AI 
judge that can (1) construct persuasive arguments that support the various possible results in the case, and 
then (2) choose from all those arguments the one that is most persuasive, and thus the result that can be 
most persuasively supported.”). 
 38. Id. (“And if the Henry Test evaluator panelists are persuaded by the argument for that result, 
that means they have concluded the result is correct.  This connection between AI brief-writing and AI 
judging is likely the most controversial claim in the paper.”). 
 39. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) 
(calling candor “the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power”); GUIDO CALABRESI, 
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 178-81 (1982) (advocating a “choice for candor” and 
explaining that the “language of categoricals” is “particularly prone to manipulation”). 
 40. See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
1, 68 (2016) (“Inherent in the very idea of judging is the notion of judgment; courts are frequently 
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trained to think in a certain way,41 or are an interpretive community,42 
some of the subjectivity is mitigated, but still much of it remains, which 
is why appellate judges often disagree and write dissents, despite 
generally being well trained in law.  Professor Volokh’s proposal would 
seem to merely shift these subjective judgments from the judges 
themselves (viewing the law in the context of a concrete dispute ex post), 
to the panel of Henry test “evaluators” (evaluating the predicted 
performance of the AI judges ex ante based on test cases).  
To be sure, the ability of the judiciary to make law is moderated and 
constrained, it is not as drastic and sudden as ex ante legislation, which is 
reserved for the legislative branch.43  As Judge Cardozo observes: “Law 
must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still.”44  This careful balance 
between stability and change is illustrated in the doctrine of retroactivity, 
which holds that a legal decision changing the law (e.g., overruling or 
narrowing a precedent) generally must be applied retroactively to other 
events taking place before the decision was rendered.45  The doctrine of 
retroactivity serves as an important check on judicial law creation.  If 
courts are forced to apply changes in the law retroactively and forced to 
confront the potential unfairness in that, they may decide to adhere to 
stare decisis and the prior rule rather than risk the unfairness of retroactive 
application, even if they would have ruled differently had they been 
writing on a clean slate.46  As such, the doctrine of retroactivity 
 
delegated regulatory and adjudicative tasks that must choose between valid and important social values.”); 
Joshua P. Davis, Law Without Mind: AI, Ethics, and Jurisprudence 1 (Univ. of S.F. Law Research Paper 
No. 2018-05, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3187513 (arguing that the 
“ultimate bulwark against ceding legal interpretation to computers – from having computers usurp the 
responsibility and authority of attorneys, citizens, and even judges – may be to recognize the role of moral 
judgment in saying what the law is.”). 
 41. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER (2009). 
 42. See Stanley Fish, Is There A Text in This Class, HARVARD U. PRESS (1980), 147-174.   
 43. A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act, 66 UCLA L. REV. 
654, 676 (2019) (“The governmental act of prospectively conferring and defining the bundle of obligations 
and privileges that yield the entitlements described above is a legislative function (at least at the federal 
level) because such rights reflect basic policy decisions that shape our society.”) (citing Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[P]rospective decisionmaking is 
incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be.”). 
 44. CARDOZO, supra note 28, at 143. See also Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative 
Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 275-76 (1961) 
(“judicial creation is an inevitable and vital part of our law . . . the process in its highest reaches is not 
discovery but creation”). 
 45. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (“When this Court applies a rule of 
federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be 
given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of 
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 278-79 (1972) (“All this, combined with the flood of 
litigation that would follow its repudication, the harassment that would ensue, and the retroactive effect 
of such a decision, led the Court to the practical result that it should sustain the unequivocal line of 
authority reaching over many years.”). 
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encourages courts to make only minor and gradual shifts in the law,47 
leaving more drastic prospective changes for the legislative branch.48  In 
this sense, it could be said that the retroactivity requirement gives teeth to 
stare decisis.49  The doctrine of retroactivity thus has roots in the 
separation of powers and ensures that although the judiciary plays a role 
in legal development, it is a softer and more measured role than the 
legislature.50  Professor Volokh’s Modified John Henry test for adoption 
of AI judges does not ensure that they would be able to adequately fulfill 
this dynamic role in the long term. 
The teachings of legal realism help to further highlight the fact that 
courts in many cases make policy choices in developing the law, working 
against the notion that law can be reduced to computing.51  To be sure, 
the result in most cases is dictated by existing law, but a significant 
fraction of cases could go either way, and when faced with such forks in 
the road, judges must make a choice about in which direction the law will 
proceed.52  Judge Cardozo also recognized “that every doubtful decision 
involves a choice between a nicely balanced alternative, and no matter 
how long we debate or how carefully we ponder, we shall never arrive at 
certitude.”53  These days, it is fairly uncontroversial to say that judges at 
 
 47. Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 70 (1965) (“Ineluctable 
retroactivity would seem to operate as an ‘inherent restraint’ on judicial lawmaking because it compels 
the Court to confront in sharpest form possible undesirable consequences of adopting a new rule, as for 
example, when it appears that application of the newly framed doctrine may result in imposing liability 
or other burden on someone who acted in justified reliance on the old law.”). 
 48. Id. at 65-66 (“Prospective lawmaking is generally equated with legislation.  Indeed, the 
conscious confrontation of the question of an effective date – even if only in the form of providing explicit 
affirmative justification for retroactive operation – smacks of the legislative process; for it is ordinarily 
taken for granted (particularly under the Blackstonian symbolic conception) that judicial decisions operate 
with inevitable retroactive effect.”). 
 49. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Prospective 
decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis.”). 
 50. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(explaining that difficulties posed by retroactivity “are one of the understood checks upon judicial 
lawmaking; to eliminate them is to render courts substantially more free to ‘make new law,’ and thus to 
alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three branches”). 
 51. See Mishkin, supra note 47, at 68 (“The insights of ‘legal realism,’ developing and spreading 
at a perhaps accelerating rate since at least the twenties, provided a necessary corrective to an overly 
rigidified conception of the Court as totally without choice or will, merely carrying out the supposedly 
preordained dictates of the Constitution.”). 
 52. See id. at 60 (explaining that “it is certainly true that courts in general handle the vast bulk of 
cases by application of preexisting law,” and that “informed estimates put the figure at close to 90%”) 
(citing Friendly, 71 YALE L.J. at 222). 
 53. CARDOZO, supra note 28, at 140. I am speaking here of classical legal realism, rather than 
what some have called “new legal realism.” See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal 
Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 831 (2008) (“We are in the midst of a flowering of ‘large-scale 
quantitative studies of facts and outcome,’ with numerous published results. The relevant studies have 
produced a New Legal Realism – an effort to understand the sources of judicial decisions on the basis of 
testable hypotheses and large data sets.”). 
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least sometimes do more than simply “call balls and strikes.”54  Indeed, 
the entire Chevron doctrine is based on the idea that for some questions 
of statutory interpretation, there is a range of reasonable answers to which 
courts must defer.55  As such, “Chevron has been seen as a triumph of 
legal realism.”56 
There likewise is often room for reasonable disagreement in the 
interpretation of precedent.  No single accepted test exists for determining 
exactly what is holding and what is dicta, and in many cases there is no 
easy way to decide.57  There will always be some possible distinction from 
a precedent case, so whether a judge chooses to follow a case turns on 
whether the proffered distinction is a meaningful one, or whether it is 
merely a distinction without a difference, an inherently subjective 
inquiry.58  The prominent legal realist Karl Lewellyn has gone so far as to 
say that the doctrine of precedent is “two-headed” or “Janus-faced” in that 
there “is one doctrine for getting rid of precedents deemed troublesome 
and one doctrine for making use of precedents that seem helpful.”59 
Professor Volokh acknowledges the legal realism objection to 
automated law, but his response is that it is dealt with by his focus on 
persuasion in the Modified John Henry test, which focuses on “which 
candidate most often persuades the evaluators,” “without any need to 
decide what the supposedly correct answer is.”60  But when choosing 
between multiple possible acceptable answers, the judge is charting a path 
for the law, to the extent that the opinion is precedential.  This path should 
be at least potentially influenced by the arguments presented to the judge 
that have been developed in the legal community in light of modern 
 
 54. See William Blake, Umpires as Legal Realists, 45 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 271, 271 (2012) 
(“During his confirmation, then-judge John Roberts anologized the role of a judge to the role of a baseball 
umpire. . . . Legal scholars have criticized Roberts from a legal realist perspective because the analogy 
misconstrues the nature of judging as formalistic.”). 
 55. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
229 (2001) (explaining that when Chevron applies, a reviewing court “is obliged to accept the agency’s 
position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable.”). 
 56. Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, 
and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 836 
(2010). 
 57. See generally Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, 70 ARK. L. REV. 661 
(2017) [hereinafter The Holding-Dictum Spectrum]. The same could be said for determining whether a 
case has been “implicitly overruled.” See generally Andrew C. Michaels, Implicit Overruling and Foreign 
Lost Profits, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 101 (2019). 
 58. See The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, supra note 57, at 685; Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining 
the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 165 (1930). 
 59. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 69-70 (1930). 
 60. Volokh, 68 DUKE L. J. at 1141. 
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circumstances and the facts of the case at hand.  Thus the crux of the legal 
realism objection to legal automation lies in the question it poses as to 
how the law chooses between alternative acceptable answers.  
Disagreements amongst judges as explicated in circuit splits and 
dissents have the beneficial epistemic effect of bringing these various 
plausible legal choices out into the open where they can potentially be 
understood and debated.  In an AI judiciary, this debate could be relegated 
to taking place within a black box.  Thus the potential uniformity of an 
AI judiciary may be overvalued.61  Replacing the human judiciary with 
an automated one that instantaneously generates an answer would erase 
the period of suspended conclusion during which societal legal thought 
takes place.62  The value of the legal process itself, and the practical 
advantages of the process being conducted by humans themselves, are 
discussed further in the next Part.  
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The role of the judiciary is not merely to develop and apply the law, 
but also to provide a check on the other two branches.  This task can be 
difficult, for it has been observed that the judiciary is the “least 
dangerous” branch in that it has “no influence over either the sword or the 
purse,” it has “neither force nor will, but merely judgment.”63 
Judgment alone can wield the power to serve as a check only to the 
extent that it diffuses broadly throughout the judiciary and to a lesser 
extent even beyond the judiciary.64  If almost no one understands the law, 
it is hard to imagine any type of a substantial public response to 
lawlessness in, say, the executive branch.  Professor Volokh’s condition 
for adoption of AI judges, demonstration that the AI judges can write 
persuasive opinions, does not seem to provide any assurance that the AI 
 
 61. Cf. Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1574 (2008) (“If the lower 
courts reach varied but reasonable conclusions about the meaning of a federal statute, and the difference 
do not create significant disruption or inequality, then the Court should decline to resolve the conflict.”). 
CARLOS NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 113 (1996) (“Intersubjective 
discussion and decision is the most reliable procedure for having access to moral truth, since the exchange 
of ideas and the need to justify oneself before others not only broaden one’s knowledge and reveal defects 
in reasoning but also help satisfy the requirement of impartial attention to the interests of everybody 
concerned.”). 
 62. Cf. Donald J. Kochan, Thinking Like Thinkers: Is the Art and Discipline of an ‘Attitude of 
Suspended Conclusion’ Lost on Lawyers?, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 64 (2011) (“lawyers must be 
reminded that seldom is an outcome clear in a legal dispute, and as such, there is almost always a rival 
proposition to ponder.”). 
 63. A Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 78 (1788). 
 64. Cf. BANJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 (1921) (“[T]he 
judgment of the lawyer class, will spread to others, and tinge the common consciousness and the common 
faith.”). 
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judiciary could fulfill its role as a check.  A machine’s ability to write a 
persuasive opinion does nothing to indicate that it can serve as an 
independent check on the other two branches.  Given that the other two 
branches would presumably maintain their lawmaking abilities, they 
would seem to have a large degree of control over an AI judiciary.  It may 
be possible to construct some AI system that provides more of a check, 
but it would not be trivial to do so, and those arguing for legal automation 
do not attempt to address this problem.     
In our current system, we have many judges applying the law, and 
although they occasionally disagree, usually they apply the law in more 
or less the same way, at least ideally; the law is not supposed to depend 
on the judge.  This is a redundancy, but one that can be beneficial,65 in 
that it fosters a community of people with incentives to pay attention to 
the law.66  It stands to reason that when people are paying attention and 
notice legal changes or inadequacies, they are able to raise awareness and 
potential public outcry.   
 But if no one is paying attention, then no one notices when the law 
changes, and it stands to reason that those with the power to change the 
law are less constrained by public sentiment.  Imagine a world in which 
all Article III judges were replaced by AI.  Unless that AI judges were 
specifically programmed to prefer human lawyers, it seems likely that the 
number of human lawyers would be greatly diminished in such a world.  
Indeed, in Professor Volokh’s argument, robot lawyers come before robot 
judges.67  And if we didn’t have human judges or lawyers, we probably 
wouldn’t have human law professors or law students either, or at least we 
wouldn’t have nearly as many.68   
Professor Volokh does recognize the possibility that “there could be a 
procedure for discretionary review of the AI Supreme Court’s decision by 
an all-human Highest Constitutional Council;”69 so, to be fair, his 
proposal would perhaps not entirely eviscerate this legal community, but 
it would drastically weaken it.  In Professor Volokh’s view, members of 
this council “might well be chosen not for legal acumen but for their 
 
 65. See John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 629 (2016) 
(“The pervasiveness of legal redundancy has at least one straightforward explanation.  Redundancy has 
much to offer.”). 
 66. See Anthony D’Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1299 
(1977) (“A second cost will be to render areas of law uninteresting. . . . At present, many people are 
immediately interested, whether financially or from a teaching or research point of view, in conflicts of 
laws.”). 
 67. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1148-51.   
 68. Cf. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 19, at 247 (“Increasing use of AI will also foster lay 
and even professional alienation from law as adjudication increasingly moves within the exclusive 
dominion of technical specialists.”). 
 69. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1190. 
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perceived moral qualities,” and would come in to play in “only a small 
portion of all cases decided by appellate judges, or even by Supreme 
Court Justices.”70 
 AI law might be more efficient, but we would have in large part lost 
the community of people whose job it is to pay attention to the law, which 
could become a problem when the law changes.71  The legal community 
is at least paying attention and that would seem provide some degree of a 
check on those with the power to change the law, at least as compared 
with a world where people are not paying attention.  The loss of 
redundancy in switching from human judges to AI thus creates some risk 
that may not be worth the potential efficiency gains  
Aside from merely monitoring the law, the legal community also plays 
a role in shaping the law, spreading power and supporting the notion that 
we, as a society, govern ourselves.  The potential to shape the law is in 
part what provides members of the legal community with incentives to 
pay attention to the law.  There would be little incentive to construct a 
quality legal argument if there were no possibility that doing so could 
shape the result, (and thereby potentially shape the law through 
precedent).  Judges are responsive to lawyers, who are responsive to 
clients, such that power to potentially shape the law is spread throughout 
the legal community and society.  This helps promote the sense that we 
as a society have some control over the laws that govern us; that we are 
governing ourselves rather than submitting to (or simply obeying) an 
outside authority.72 
Those in the legal community have all been trained to think similarly, 
that is, like lawyers.73  When we say that the result in ninety percent of 
cases is determined by law whereas maybe ten percent could go either 
way, what we mean is that for those ninety percent, no reasonable judge 
or lawyer would decide the other way, but this only works to the extent 
that most lawyers think in a similar way.   A judge writing an opinion is 
in part explaining their reasoning so that the legal community and society 
can better understand the decision and thus the law.  A legal opinion is 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Cf. FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 72 
(2017) (“The problem is that when we outsource thinking to machines, we are really outsourcing thinking 
to the organizations that run the machines.”). 
 72. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“ours is a government of laws, not of men, and . . . we submit ourselves to rulers only if 
under rules.”). 
 73. Cf. Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening 
(A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803, 828 (2009) (“When one thinks of what lawyers must 
strive to do – which is mainly resolve difficult disputes and control the future though documentary writings 
– certain things emerge as crucial to their work.  One is that they speak and think in a common language. 
. . . To the extent that ‘all lawyers think alike,’ they can with some certainty predict what other lawyers 
will do – both in litigation and in transactional contexts. This is arguably socially useful.”). 
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thus in part a discourse between society and the legal system, and the fact 
that the judge is also a member of society and the legal community would 
seem beneficial to this discourse.   
This discourse can deter abuses of authority, for even “simply 
anticipating the need to give reasons and enhance deliberative rigor,” 
“reason-giving coveys respect for one’s audience,” and when “citizens 
can evaluate and critique public officials’ reasons, they are better poised 
to ensure that the government acts in their best interests.”74  But if the 
legal community has no legitimate opportunity to question the AI judge’s 
reasons through argument or on appeal and attempt to persuade, the value 
of reason giving is diminished.75  To the extent that an AI judge is a black 
box, its true reasons are unknown (secret) or even unknowable, and to the 
extent that the AI judiciary is not persuadable such that there is no 
meaningful opportunity to challenge its reasons, the giving of reasons is 
largely “a hollow exercise.”76 
It is also worth considering whether an AI judiciary could comply with 
Article III’s case or controversy requirement.77 This requirement “is not 
just an empty formality;” rather, it “preserves the vitality of the 
adversarial process,” such that the legal questions presented “will be 
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a 
concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the 
consequences of judicial action.”78  Courts exercise an important 
lawmaking and policymaking function when they interpret the law so as 
to resolve legal questions, and it is beneficial for such interpretation to 
take place in the context of concrete factual disputes.   
When exactly is the AI judge making its decision?  Has it in some sense 
already made its decision before the case?  One could perhaps argue that 
the decision is made when the machine is programmed, in which case, the 
decision would not be made in the context of an actual case or controversy 
as required by Article III.  In other words, the human decision-making 
point is in the choice of the AI judge, rather than in deciding the concrete 
case as in our current system.  To be sure, there is currently human 
decision-making involved in our choice of human judges, but we 
 
 74. Ashley S. Deeks, Secret Reason-Giving, 129 YALE L. J. 612, 627-28 (2020); see also John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 580 (1971) (“[J]ustification is argument addressed to those who disagree with 
us, or to ourselves when we are of two minds.”). 
 75. See Deeks, Secret Reason-Giving, 129 YALE L. J. at 675-76 (explaining that secret reason 
giving “imposes only a weak form of constraint” particularly “when the reason-giver merely goes through 
the motions of developing a reason,” or “when those receiving the reasons feel as though they have little 
latitude to push back, critique, or otherwise signal dissatisfaction”). 
 76. Id. at 676. 
 77. See U.S. CONST. Art. III §§ 1-2. 
 78. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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generally do not know exactly how the human judges we choose will 
decide cases in the future, and sometimes their views shift over time.  The 
computer code programming an AI judge could be seen as an incredibly 
detailed statute or “code”,79 one that pre-answers all possible questions, 
albeit in a black box way.80   
To the extent that there is private intellectual property covering the 
code behind AI judges, the problems are compounded.81  If and to the 
extent that we do start to turn the law into code, at the very least the code 
must be public and not owned as intellectual property.  If the code is 
public, then lawyers together with computer scientists (or lawyers trained 
in computer science) could at least examine the code and thus the law, 
though it would not necessarily be easy to construct a system where 
computer scientist lawyers would have an adequate incentive and ability 
to do so.  Just as judges do not own the opinions they write, the artificial 
judges themselves, or the code behind them, must not be owned; since the 
law is binding on citizens, it must remain free for all to examine and 
attempt to understand.82  The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that 
“no one can own the law,” given that every “citizen is presumed to know 
 
 79. Cf. Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1043 (“A ‘code,’ 
let us say, is a legislative enactment which entirely pre-empts the field and which is assumed to carry 
within it the answers to all possible questions: thus when a court comes to a gap or an unforeseen situation, 
its duty is to find, by extrapolation and analogy, a solution consistent with the policy of the codifying 
law.”). 
 80. See Asay, supra note 23, at 29 (“because of the lack of transparency surrounding AI systems 
in a number of important industries, some scholars have complained that such AI systems are a ‘black 
box’”) (citing FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015)); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 
19, at 262 (“Perhaps the most widely appreciated risk of AI decision-making is that it could function in 
ways that are hard or impossible for humans to comprehend.”); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The 
Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018); Cade Metz, Mark 
Zuckerberg, Elon Musk and the Feud Over Killer Robots, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/technology/elon-musk-mark-zuckerberg-artificial-
intelligence.html [perma.cc/B26Z-CMAV] (quoting Mark Zuckerberg testifying before Congress: “Right 
now, a lot of our A.I. systems make decisions in ways that people don’t really understand.”); Harry Surden 
& Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 121, 127 (2016) (“A system is ‘technologically opaque’ if it is difficult for an ordinary person to 
understand what is going on inside that system.”). 
 81. Cf. Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. 
REV. 54, 141 (2019) (“The future of civil rights in an age of AI requires us to explore the limitations 
within intellectual property and, more specifically, trade secrets.”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 213 (1979) (“It is one of the important principles of the [rule of 
law] doctrine that the making of particular laws should be guided by open and relatively stable general 
rules.”). 
 82. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888) (“Judges, as is well understood, receive 
from the public treasury a stated annual salary, fixed by law, and can themselves have no pecuniary 
interest or proprietorship as against the public at large, in the fruits of their judicial labor. . . .  The question 
is one of public policy, and there has always been a judicial consensus . . . that no copyright could under 
the statutes passed by Congress, be secured in the products of the labor done by judicial officers in the 
discharge of their judicial duties.”). 
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the law,” so “all should have free access to its contents.”83  The same 
should be true of AI judges, particularly if they are not persuadable by 
humans.  Although one cannot look inside the mind of a human judge, a 
lawyer does in our present system usually have the opportunity to attempt 
to address the judge’s concerns.  
In any event, the primary concern surrounding Article III is that an AI 
judiciary could not sufficiently check the other two branches.  Although 
separation of powers is not explicitly in the Constitution, it is considered 
to be implicit in a number of provisions, including the clauses that vest 
each of the three branches with certain responsibilities.84  The Supreme 
Court has discussed the importance of the “constitutionally mandated 
balance of power” to checking “abuses of government power” by 
preventing “the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch,” so 
as to “reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse.”85  
The separation of powers concerns discussed above make AI decision-
making particularly problematic in the judicial branch.  Although some 
machine decision-making is already being done in the executive branch 
or the administrative agencies,86 this does not seem as problematic.  One 
way of thinking about the executive branch is that it is entirely or mostly 
accountable through the President anyway,87 so if the President chooses 
to delegate to AI rather than humans, that is seemingly their prerogative, 
and in any event, it doesn’t raise separation of powers concerns.  
Moreover, given that administrative agencies do not make law through 
precedent in the way that courts do, many of the other arguments above 
would not apply as strongly to the agencies.  
 
 83. Georgia v. Public Resource.org, Inc., No. 18-1150, 590 U.S. __ , slip op. at *7-8 (2020). 
 84. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar, Patent Court Specialization, 104 IOWA L. REV. 101, 118 (2019) (“The 
term ‘separation of powers’ does not appear in the Constitution, but is instead inferred from the dividing 
of legislative, executive, and judicial power into separate Articles.”) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 124 (1976); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 439-40 (1998)). 
 85. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) (also discussing the importance of 
federalism and how the dividing of power between the Federal Government and the States similarly 
prevents abuse by providing “double security”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 323 (James Madison) 
(“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two 
distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate 
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.”)). 
 86. See Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1280 
(2018) (“Given its utility, it is not surprising that government decision-makers seek to harness machine 
learning’s predictive power for public-sector use. These tools already have made significant inroads in 
the contexts of national security and law enforcement.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1923) (“The ordinary duties of officers 
prescribed by statute come under the general administrative control of the President by virtue of the 
general grant to him of executive power, and he may properly supervise and guide their construction of 
the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which 
Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President 
alone.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Replacing judges with AI would entail drastic changes to law as we 
know it and it is not at all clear that the changes would be for the better. 
Nevertheless, proponents of AI law suggest three primary benefits: 
efficiency, consistency, and access to justice.    
Regarding efficiency,88 the judiciary is comparatively not that 
expensive,89 and it seems like money well spent in preserving the voice 
of humans in the law that governs them.  An automated judiciary might 
be faster, but the legal disagreements that arise from circuit splits and 
dissents may actually be beneficial for society in that they engage the 
legal community in protracted discussions about various sides of 
important legal issues.90  In any event, efficiency arguments do not 
adequately account for the increased risks due to the loss of redundancy, 
nor do they answer the related separation of powers concerns.91  Indeed, 
efficiency is not always paramount in rule of law, for the “doctrine of 
separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to 
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”92 And 
by for example adopting AI research tools or an AI staff attorney, some 
efficiency benefits could be achieved without going so far as to automate 
the Article III judges themselves. 
Second, proponents argue that an AI judiciary would be less biased and 
 
 88. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1139 n.10 (“In some contexts, of course, automation may be better 
even if it’s not as effective – for instance, it may be cheaper and thus more cost-effective.  But if it’s 
cheaper and at least as effective, then it would be pretty clearly superior.”); Huq, supra note 14, at *37 
(“Right now, the demand for human review in the teeth of its likely costs and available alternative 
responses, might seem little more than an aesthetic preference about the manner in which one interacts 
with state actors.  I am not sure that is enough to get a right to human decision off the ground.”); Casey & 
Niblett, supra note 16 at 1403 (“A new form of law, the microdirective, will emerge to provide all of the 
benefits of both rules and standards without the costs of either.  These microdirectives will provide ex 
ante behavioral prescriptions finely tailored to every possible scenario.”). 
 89. Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2019 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUMMARY 5 (2018) (“The judiciary’s appropriation request for fiscal year 2019 
totals [$7.863 Billion]”); with OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. (COMPTROLLER), NATIONAL 
DEFENSE BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR FY 2020 at 1 (2019) (showing $685 Billion DOD Discretionary 
Budget Authority for 2019); and JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE “TAX 
CUT AND JOBS ACT” AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE ON NOVEMBER 
16, 2017 at 7 (2017) (estimating a net loss of over $1 trillion over fiscal years 2018-2027).  
 90. See JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 12 (1933) (explaining that reflective thinking “involves (1) 
a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of 
searching, hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the 
perplexity.”).  
 91. See supra Part IV; cf. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
1365, 1380 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“A judicial hearing before a property interest is stripped away 
. . . can slow things down.  But economy supplies no license for ignoring these – often vitally inefficient 
– protections.”).   
 92. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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therefore more consistent.93  An initial response is that there could also be 
bias built into the AI, as has been well documented in the literature.94  
There is not much reason to think that the biases of the AI judges would 
be any different or less than whatever the biases of the Modified John 
Henry test panel of evaluators. But even assuming that the AI judges 
would be better than humans on this score, that would still not do anything 
to address all of the concerns above.  The better way to deal with bias 
would be for human judges to work on becoming more aware of it and 
compensating for it, or better yet, to diversify the judiciary, as these would 
be more well-tailored solutions to the problem of judicial bias.  Another 
more well-tailored way to deal with judicial bias might be to reduce 
judicial discretion in situations (such as perhaps criminal sentencing) 
where the effects of bias tend to be particularly acute.95  Bias in the 
judiciary is a problem, but automating the judiciary is an overbroad and 
inappropriate solution to that particular problem.     
The third potential benefit offered is that the lower cost of legal services 
will improve access to justice.96  The distinction between the public and 
private sectors matters here.  In the private sector, if a new technology 
such as artificial intelligence is able to outcompete the incumbent human 
lawyers by performing adequately at a lower cost, this article presents no 
quarrel with allowing the market to choose such lower cost alternatives.  
To the extent that this happens, it could lower the cost of legal services, 
such that we could receive some of the access to justice benefits without 
going so far as to replace Article III judges.  An AI arbitration system, so 
long is it is voluntarily agreed to, might be another way to possibly 
 
 93. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1140 (“And because such a program is also likely to be much 
cheaper, quicker, and less subject to certain forms of bias, it promises to make the legal system not only 
more efficient but also fairer and more accessible to poor and middle-class litigants.”); Huq, supra note 
14, at *6 (“machine decisions are often capable of classification with a smaller number of false positives 
and false negatives than humans, and have the potential to act with fewer distorting biases”); Casey & 
Niblett, 92 IND. L. J. at 1410 (“And the laws will be highly calibrated to policy objectives with no chance 
of judges introducing bias or incompetence.”); see also Benjamin Alarie et al., Regulation by Machine 4 
(Dec. 6, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2878950 (“In a world where taxpayers 
receive instantaneous rulings from regulators, the algorithm is the law. This new form of law is 
characterized by greater consistency than regulators and courts could previously offer. The biases of 
regulators, adjudicators, and judges are washed away, further reducing legal uncertainty.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit 
Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579 (2018). 
 95. Cf. Berman, supra note 86, at 1283 (arguing that “government actors should exploit the 
benefits of machine learning when they enjoy broad discretion in making decisions, while eschewing the 
tool for decision-making when government discretion is highly constrained”); Re & Solow-Niederman, 
supra note 19, at 243-44 (“Already, human judges increasingly rely on algorithmic analysis when making 
bail and parole determinations that affect the freedom of many thousands of people every year.”). 
 96. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1147 (“Realistically, the only way we are likely to sharply 
increase access to expensive services, such as lawyering, is through technology.”); cf. Alaire et. al., supra 
note 93, at *1 (“machine learning can predict how courts would decide legal disputes more cheaply and 
accurately than human regulators”). 
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capture some access to justice benefits while maintaining a human Article 
III judiciary.  
In short, the arguments for AI judges underappreciate and undervalue 
the human aspects of law.  If there are advantages to AI judges, the 
advantages are limited and may well be outweighed by the substantial 
disadvantages, which include a questionable ability to dynamically adapt 
over time to changing circumstances, and possible detrimental effects 
regarding separation of powers.  At the least, these potential drawbacks 
of an AI judiciary are worth taking seriously, and should be considered 
and addressed before any plan to move in the direction of judicial 
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